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Abstract 
 
 As research into Operating and Support (O&S) costs matures, the focus can 
narrow.  This research represents a first of its kind for the Air Force; it is an empirical 
study to analyze the effects of new engines on fuel efficiency and maintenance over those 
engines they replace.  Within this research, new engines are those with distinct Type 
Series Modification (TMS) designators that appear within categories of Mission 
Designation System (MDS) aircraft.  The only new engines appear on C-5s, C-130s, and 
C-135s. The inclusion of retired engines brings in two fighter aircraft, F-15s and F-16s.  
The data source is the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database, which 
collects flying hours and gallons of fuel and is available by engine.  Using this data, the 
realized fuel efficiencies of the new engines can be effectively graphed, quantified and 
tested. Maintenance costs are not tracked by engine but are approximated from ratios 
determined by AFTOC.  Of note, these costs do not include Contractor Logistics Support 
(CLS) which may weaken the analysis for estimating future engine maintenance costs.  
From the data available, the potential savings that can be realized in fuel and maintenance 
are significant and do not come at a trade-off in engine performance. 
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QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT ENGINE UPGRADES ON 
OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Despite Operating and Support (O&S) costs accounting for an average of 55 
percent of total life cycle costs (Jones, et al., 2014), no study to date has attempted to 
quantify the effects of new engines on sustainment costs.  This thesis fills that void by 
analyzing before and after effects on O&S costs based on three new engines and seven 
retired engines across 38 aircraft platforms and one additional new engine on a helicopter 
platform. O&S consists of all sustainment costs, including manpower, fuel, supplies, 
maintenance, upgrades, etc. (CAPE, 2016), but this thesis examines the fuel performance 
and maintenance costs of engines only. 
The B-52H re-engine cost estimate motivated this research.  The analysts at the 
Air Force Life-Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) were tasked to brief what the new 
B-52H O&S costs would be after the engines were upgraded.  Unfortunately, the cost 
community does not have available or published Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) 
for how to account for O&S effects after an engine modification.  Therefore, to have a 
defendable estimate, the analysts turned to the analogous C-5 RERP (Reliability 
Enhancement and Re-engining).  Using programmatic data for the C-5 and the B-52 as 
well as the historical costs per Flying Hours the cost analysts derived the estimate. 
This work broadens those efforts by more holistically examining the effects of 
engine upgrades on ongoing O&S costs across a variety of aircraft systems.  Future cost 
analysts for major modifications may be able to use these findings to help formulate cost 
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estimates with the results of this research. The impact of these better refined estimates 
will be found in the improved decision support process by program managers competing 
for Air Force resources.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Put succinctly, how do engine upgrades impact ongoing O&S costs?  The first 
step entails finding comparable aircraft with data on at least two different engines.  As 
further discussed in Chapter III, a different engine is defined here as of those engines 
with a separate Type Series Modification (TMS) designator.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, a major engine modification is one that is applicable to the O&S Cost 
Management Guidebook published by Department of Defense (DoD) whose glossary 
defines a modification as “any modification that is of sufficient cost and complexity that 
it could itself qualify as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I through ACAT III program 
for acquisition management purposes (2016, pg 151).”  This includes any modification 
that is itself a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) or qualifies as an ACAT III 
or higher. 
Effectively solving ongoing engine costs improves O&S cost estimates.  This is 
particularly important since O&S costs are historically some of the most difficult costs to 
correctly capture (Ryan, et al., 2012).  Better estimates arm decision makers with better 
information.  Properly informed decision makers can then decide between alternatives 
balancing the cost or performance of an engine modification.  Decision makers will likely 
value improved O&S estimates as evidenced by the recent increase in the focus of getting 
O&S costs estimates correct (GAO, 2010). 
1.3 Method of Analysis 
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Further described in Chapter III, this thesis descriptively compares the actual 
maintenance costs and calculated fuel efficiencies characteristics of new engines against 
the actual observations of those engines that are being replaced.  The observed 
differences are displayed visually and are statistically tested.  Actual data for engine 
inventory on aircraft is used to find engine pairings. Engines put into place after Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2017 do not have at least two years of new O&S costs for statistical 
comparison. By the same logic, only those engines that have been in place since FY1998 
allows for two years of pre-modification O&S data using Air Force Total Ownership 
Cost (AFTOC) stand-up-date of FY1996. In short, only those engines which entered the 
service between FY1998 through FY2017 are considered, for a total of 19 years of O&S 
data.  Discussed further in Chapter II, not all weapon systems account equally in O&S 
costs and this research focuses solely on Air Force aircraft. 
To be useful, the structural break comparing the –pre and –post modification cost 
data must have statistically significant relationships.  In order to mitigate against a Type 
II error, which is a failure to find a relationship where one exists, a chosen alpha (α) level 
of 0.1 applies. An alpha of 0.1 is appropriate for exploratory analysis where the desire is 
to minimize missed opportunities that show statistically significant relationships. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Using the methods just described, the scope of this analysis addresses the 
following research questions: 
1. What are the quantifiable effects of an engine upgrade to the ongoing O&S 
costs of a weapon system? To what effect can these be measured and how useful are they 
in analysis for the future? 
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2. How do these effects vary across different weapon systems? Specifically, do 
different platforms or categories of aircraft behave the similiar ways?  Is a new engine to 
a heavy transport analogous to a new engine in a fighter jet?  
3. To what extent do historical data have predictive capacity for future O&S cost 
estimates? What are the corresponding confidence levels?  What does the empirical data 
reveal? 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter II covers a 
review of the literature pertaining to O&S cost estimates as well as a description of the 
statistical methods applied to the empirical data.  Chapter III focuses on the methodology 
of the data collection sources and the limits of the data.  Additionally, this chapter 
explains the statistical method applied.  Within Chapter IV, the analysis and results of the 
statistical tests address the research questions posed. Lastly, Chapter V formally 
concludes the thesis with the interpretation and summarization proposed to answer the 
research questions as well as provide recommendations on further areas of study. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter discusses what the current state O&S research reveals. We first 
examine what exactly O&S is and how it is recorded. We then discuss some of the 
research concerning O&S, which has benefited from an increased focus in recent years 
(Ryan, et al., 2012) as Congress and the DoD have tried to control what is frequently the 
highest portion of a weapon system life cycle. In addition to peer reviewed journals, 
interested parties that have analyzed O&S costs include the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers (such as the RAND Corporation), and DoD schools such as the 
Naval Postgraduate School or the Air Force Institute of Technology.  Finally we discuss 
some characteristics of engines and what the research suggests should happen as they are 
upgraded. 
2.2 What Qualifies as Operating and Support Costs? 
 The rules and definitions for O&S costs are defined in the Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) O&S Cost Estimating Guide, the DoD O&S Cost 
Management Guidebook, DoD Instruction 5000.02, and Air Force Instruction 65-508.  
The Guidebook defines O&S costs as “sustainment costs incurred from the initial system 
deployment through the end of system operations. Includes all costs of operating, 
maintaining, and supporting a fielded system. Specifically, this consists of the costs 
(organic and contractor) of personnel, equipment, supplies, software, and services 
associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, and otherwise supporting a 
system in the DoD inventory (DoD, 2016, pg 5).”  Costs also occur before initial system 
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deployment, as well as disposal costs after a system’s useful life.  Taken together these 
costs constitute a weapon systems Life Cycle Costs (LCC).  LCCs consist of four 
overlapping phases of support which include: Research and Development, Investment, 
O&S, and Disposal.  This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Life-Cycle Costs for a DoD Weapon System (Jones, et al. 2014) 
 Research and Development includes activities such as creating and testing 
prototypes.  Investment costs can be viewed synonymously as production costs. Disposal 
costs tend to be minimal, and can usually be simplified into O&S costs (O’Hanlon et al., 
2018; Hewitson, et al., 2018).  For the purposes of this thesis, we are concerned only with 
O&S costs. CAPE directs O&S costs are categorized into six main categories as shown in 
Table 1. Each category also has sub-hierarchies underneath them which further categorize 
costs into lower levels.   
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Table 1: Main Categories of O&S Costs from CAPE 
Level Title Description 
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower 
Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower 
assigned to operating units. May include military, civilian, 
and/or contractor manpower. 
2.0 Unit Operations 
Cost of unit operating material (e.g., fuel and training 
material), unit support services, and unit travel. Excludes 
material for maintenance and repair. 
3.0 Maintenance 
Cost of all system maintenance other than maintenance 
manpower assigned to operating units. Consists of organic 
and contractor maintenance. 
4.0 Sustaining Support Cost of system support activities that are provided by organizations other than the system’s operating units. 
5.0 Continuing System Improvements Cost of system hardware and software modifications. 
6.0 Indirect Support 
Cost of support activities that provide general services that 
lack the visibility of actual support to specific force units or 
systems.  
 
 The current cost element structure shown in Table 1 originated in 2014.  The 2014 
change was mostly to the titles with the exception of changing how contractor support 
was combined under Maintenance (for a detailed analysis of each of the different 
categories and subcategories and definitions see Chapter 6 of the CAPE O&S Cost 
estimating guide).  While there is natural variation, people, parts and fuel account for 70 
to 90 percent of O&S costs (OSD, 2016).  For the purpose of this thesis it is important to 
realize that many factors affecting the costs reported. For instance, Unit-Level Manpower 
includes operator and maintenance crews, such as air crews.  Manpower billets can act 
more of a function of the total overall budget rather than only tied to the costs of 
maintaining an engine.  Similarly, changes to overall Air Force budget can affect unit 
8 
operation costs as expenses such as temporary duty travel become subject to higher 
scrutiny and justification.   
Indirect Support costs do not tie directly to any particular weapon system or piece 
of equipment.  Some examples would include base operations support, personnel 
management, family housing or general training and education such as Professional 
Military Education.  Since these costs are indirect, if they vary after an engine 
modification, those costs would not tie directly to that engine change; therefore indirect 
support costs are excluded from this analysis. This approach is also consistent with the 
Boito et al. (2015) recommendation to include only elements one through five when 
comparing O&S costs.  
Complicating O&S costs, when evaluating modifications is that O&S costs 
sometimes include continuing system improvements to hardware or software that could 
be coded as either Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Procurement 
or simple O&S costs (OSD CAPE, 2014).  Within the same guidance, life cycle estimates 
for O&S should include a note about assumptions for mid-life upgrades or Service Life 
Extension Programs (SLEP) associated with the planned system life (OSD CAPE, 2014). 
The methodology section of Chapter III expands on these concepts and how it is handled 
where it is relevant.  
2.3 How much are O&S costs? 
For many programs, the system O&S costs will be the largest of the four cost 
categories, which is a key reason why there is renewed emphasis on O&S affordability 
and cost management (OSD CAPE, 2014). Although overall costs did decline somewhat 
under sequestration around 2013, O&S costs on average are rising (Ferry, 2013). In 
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constant 2019 dollars O&S costs went from $13.5 billion dollars in 1999 to $39.6 billion 
in 2019 as recorded in AFTOC. Given that the effects of inflation are removed from 
Figure 2, we would expect the slope of costs to be relatively flat if O&S only kept pace 
with inflation. 
Figure 2: O&S Costs 1999-2019 
Conventional wisdom used to hold that O&S, as the longest phase of the life cycle 
costs, accounted for approximately 70% of total costs.  This was coined the “golden 
ratio.”  However, Jones, White, Ryan and Ritschel (2014) investigated the accuracy of 
the golden ratio and discovered that the true cost of O&S varies based on weapon system, 
with a low of 16% for Space Systems, to a high of 70% for Automated Information 
systems.  The calculated overall average O&S costs across the DoD was around 55%. 
Even using those more conservative figures, it still holds that O&S costs consist of the 
majority of a weapon system costs over the life cycle. Jones, et al. (2014) also stated that 
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the tendency to reduce the life-cycle costs of a weapon systems to a single ratio with 
respect to acquisition costs is impractical. 
What remains practical are initiatives to reduce O&S costs. GAO (2010) 
highlighted the lack of initiatives to reduce O&S costs, and the Air Force pointed to the 
Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century program which had the goal (among others) 
of reducing O&S costs by 10 percent. The extent to which that happened is unknown. 
RAND (Boito, et al., 2016) also made a recommendations to senior leadership to place 
more attention on O&S costs to increase visibility of these costs and their drivers in order 
to make cost savings improvements. Modifications are one of those O&S cost drivers and 
the answers to the research questions are designed to help meet this goal. 
2.4 Prior O&S Cost Research 
Traditionally, the DoD focused cost research on the acquisition component of a 
system’s life cycle instead of O&S costs.  Because of this focus, DoD research has 
managed to gain valuable insights into acquisition costs and how those costs behave over 
time.  These insights formed the framework for acquisition process revisions and cost 
saving improvements (Ryan, 2012). Ryan, et al. made the further observation that: 
“Between 1945 and 2009, there were over 130 separate studies and commissions focused 
on the acquisition of DoD systems, dozens of which involved the nature of acquisition 
cost behavior. During this same time period, there appears not to be a single published 
study pertaining to how system costs behave during the O&S phase (2012, pg 363).”  
Ryan's observations would be supported by the GAO’s 2010 conclusion that the DoD 
lacks key information to effectively manage and reduce O&S costs on most military 
weapon systems. Further support from GAO came in 2012 that also concluded that 
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weapon system O&S cost estimating and reporting were inconsistent, unreliable, and 
lacked effective oversight.  A similar observation to Ryan (2012) was reiterated more 
recently by O’Hanlon (2018) who stated that an abundance of military research focused 
on acquisition and research and development costs while minimal research specifically 
focused on O&S costs.  
This is not to say that there were no studies on O&S results but rather a lack of 
focus.  There are some earlier studies within the DoD which compare the operating costs 
caused by aging weapon systems.  For example, the CBO studied the effects of aging on 
O&S as early as 2001 and Dixon (2005) also researched the rising costs of aging aircraft.  
In addition, studies have been performed to exam how to best use O&S dollars in order to 
increase aircraft availability (Fry, 2010).  However, examined as a whole, the DoD did 
not routinely study O&S costs prior to 2012. 
 Attention to O&S costs increased with the passage of the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009.  WSARA dictates that within a year from 
enactment, the Comptroller General is to submit a report on growth in O&S for major 
weapon systems (Public Law, 2009).  Since then, WSARA has served as a catalyst for 
increased focus on O&S costs in the DoD (Ryan, 2012).  Worth noting is that despite this 
increased focus, there may be no direct measureable linkage between WSARA policies 
and improvements to the acquisition process (Banford, et al., 2014). 
 In O&S research many of the studies compare O&S estimates to actuals. This was 
for good reason since, as of 2012, the DoD had no concept for how O&S cost estimates 
compared to actual costs (Ryan et al., 2012).  A possible reason for this would be that 
cost reports changed and varied among programs based on metric or time frame (GAO, 
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2012). That is to say that the earlier studies compared estimates to actual costs instead of 
focusing on trends within the actual costs themselves, which is the manner of this 
research. 
 There has been research related to O&S actual costs and into the many factors that 
may drive O&S costs.  Some cost drivers are more apparent than others, for example 
O&S costs are theorized to be unique to a particular weapon system; for example, the 
cost profile and expenditures of a fighter aircraft may be different than that of a cargo 
aircraft (O’Hanlon et al., 2018). Other research shows that as the US Air Force responds 
to more threats and increases its Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO), this will lead to the use 
of more fuel and cause additional wear and tear on the equipment.  Both of these factors 
lead to increases in O&S costs (GAO, 2018).  Additionally, as alluded to in Section 2.2, 
increasing the overall budget will lead to increases in O&S costs. The CBO normalized 
for increasing budgets in their 2018 study and estimated that the real cost growth 
associated with aircraft aging generally ranged from 1.5 to 4.1 percent from 1999-2016 
(CBO, 2018).  Additionally, research has shown that changes to the overall flying hour 
budget led to changes in O&S expenditures, with the exception of Petroleum, Oil, and 
Lubricants (POL), which were found to be directly proportional to flying hours, O&S 
costs have been shown on average to increase by about six percent as flying hours 
increase ten percent (Unger, 2009). 
 Other O&S research has had more surprising results; contrary to expectations one 
finding was that cost O&S cost estimate accuracy should improve as programs mature 
but in fact, they improve little over the time of a program (Ryan, et al., 2012).  
Nevertheless, Hewitson et al. (2018) conducted research on the stabilization properties in 
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O&S costs as a measure of when the variability of costs from year to year and he found 
that stability results vary by category but generally it is found to occur 80% of the time 
around five years after the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) phase (Hewitson, 2018). 
There have also been studies on O&S cost differences across platforms; for 
example, in one study a comparison of the O&S costs of 21 platforms with their 
antecedent showed only seven of them to be cheaper to operate (Harrison, 2013). Since 
then, studies have also looked at the timing of O&S costs and looked into the bathtub 
effect where costs are initially high when the system is new, shrink as expertise is 
acquired and grow again as systems age.  Because of this effect, it is also important in 
cross system comparisons that costs be compared ideally at maturity, meaning when the 
fleet reaches the maximum size and steady-state in order to have a more homogeneous 
comparison (Boito, et al., 2015). 
A study into newer planes showed a decreasing O&S cost in the maturation phase 
(CBO, 2018), which is important to take into consideration in cross system comparisons.  
The importance of good research into O&S cannot be understated as today’s acquisitions 
commit the government to large future obligations in O&S costs (Ferry, 2013).  The 
impact of the magnitude of O&S cost decisions are at their greatest during early design 
decisions (DoD, 2016). Sustainment strategy decisions originate early in the program 
lifecycle with significant long-term operational and cost implications (Ritschel and 
Ritschel, 2016).  
2.5 How are O&S Costs are Recorded? 
Since WSARA created the requirement for O&S estimates and cost reporting, the 
DoD has mandated that each military service maintain a historical database of actual 
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O&S costs for their systems. This led to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.4-M, Cost 
Analysis Guidance and Procedures, which tasked each Component to provide a single 
authoritative, database for financial and logistics data organized by system or 
infrastructure. Since then, each military department has developed and maintains their 
own historical O&S cost data collection system. These data systems were developed in 
response to an initiative known as Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs (VAMOSC). CAPE provides broad policy guidance pertaining to the military 
department VAMOSC programs, but leaves the details concerning implementation to 
each department. CAPE took this approach so that each department could make 
maximum use of its existing unique management information systems (e.g., maintenance 
data collection or logistics financial management systems) (OSD CAPE, 2014).  Though 
the primary focus of VAMOSC is for future planning and the development of O&S 
estimates, the nature of the database allows for actual O&S costs to be sorted by weapon 
system and by year (Ryan, et al. 2012).  
In the early stages of the VAMOSC data system, a GAO review showed that the 
Air Force’s and Navy’s systems do not collect actual cost data for several cost elements 
(2010).  VAMOSC does not collect actual cost data on some recommended cost elements 
such as support equipment replacement or modifications. These findings were validated 
by Boito, et al. when they studied aircraft O&S costs and found challenges with the 
VAMSOC system specifically, they noted that they did not always capture cost metrics 
for O&S activities and that metrics should “be formally established and consistently 
tracked within both organically performed and contracted activities, and periodically 
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reviewed by Air Force leadership in conjunction with corresponding mission 
performance measures (2016, pg 5).”  
Despite early challenges, there is evidence that some improvements have been 
made.  In recent study the GAO determined the information to be sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of presenting sustainment metrics, such as aircraft availability and O&S 
costs, although that study was more concerned with reliability metrics than strictly with 
costs (2018).  This runs contrary to a CBO study that expressed a need for more 
comprehensive and complete data—specifically, cost and age data for individual aircraft 
over a longer period so that estimates could be more precise. This level of detail would 
have allowed the CBO to estimate the effects of aging over the life cycle of aircraft under 
different budgetary regimes. Those data, however, were not readily available (CBO, 
2018). 
The Air Force system designed to be compliant with the requirements of 
VAMOSC is the AFTOC system, or the Air Force Total Ownership Cost system. It 
provides O&S cost information on all Air Force aircraft, space systems, and missiles. The 
O&S cost information collected includes unit-level manpower, fuel, depot maintenance 
overhaul costs, depot-level reparable costs, and other costs of major US Air Force aircraft 
and engines. AFTOC also maintains data on aircraft quantities and flying hours, numbers 
of personnel, and other non-cost information (OSD CAPE, 2014). The system provides 
more than just costs, and, in compliance with the CAPE guide, also provides users with 
system-level data, as well as lower levels of data (major subsystems and components). 
VAMSOC data systems, such as AFTOC, should provide O&S-related non-cost data, 
such as system quantities, manning levels, and operating tempos. [Note: Further 
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information about data fields and AFTOC reporting is available in AFTOC manuals.] 
AFTOC data presentation is generally well suited for analysis in statistical programs or 
common software programs within the force. 
2.6 Contractor Logistics Support 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) is another complication to the analysis of 
O&S costs.  CLS is when the contractor performs the maintenance on a weapons system 
instead of the DoD organically performing maintenance.  The popularity of CLS has been 
rising in recent years and may be beneficial.  Ritschel and Ritschel (2016) found that CLS 
average performance outperforms organic by over three percent for the standard ratio, 
meaning that the availability rate of aircraft is higher.  However, CLS comes as a trade-
off since it was found to be more expensive than organic aircraft maintenance. 
Specifically, they found that the asset specificity phenomenon (propriety advantages) 
outweighs the benefits of competition such that the contractor’s intimate knowledge of 
complex platforms made up for the monopoly of servicing the aircraft. 
The reason CLS can be a challenge for analysis is because VAMOSC systems 
may collect CLS costs in aggregate but without providing any details by cost elements 
such as depot maintenance (OSD CAPE, 2014).  Within reported CLS costs it is difficult 
to determine what preciously is being paid for other than the overall category of 
maintenance.  The guidebook states that CLS and Depot cost categories are difficult to 
categorize since they are likely to include costs for manpower and parts as well as other 
things such as overhead and facilities (DoD, 2016). 
2.7 Reasons for Engine Upgrades 
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Saving money is a job of Program Managers (PM) who must manage O&S costs 
to realize more affordable programs, and DoD leadership expects the PM to report 
progress toward meeting affordability requirements at program reviews. Because of this, 
it is important that O&S data be collected so that the PM or Component can evaluate the 
success of the O&S cost management efforts (DoD, 2016). 
Aging aircraft is itself a driver of cost increases. The Heritage Foundation 
reported that, as of 2019, the average age of our aircraft is over 29 years, yet the Air 
Force has no plans to raise acquisition rates for the F-35 or KC-46 to buy down that 
average (Heritage Foundation, 2019).  Another alternative to replacing a fleet is to 
replace an engine, a major driver of O&S costs.  This is the tactic employed by the B-52 
program office to extend the life of that fleet while capturing reductions in fuel costs (Air 
Force, 2017). 
The Air Force has commissioned studies to investigate the savings potential from 
installing more fuel efficient or more reliable engines.  One such example was a 2016 
RAND study discussing potential C-130 improvements such as engine-out taxiing, 
optimum flying levels and speeds, weight reductions, load-balancing improvements, 
reducing auxiliary power units, and installing microvanes. RAND suggested that full 
implementation of these options would save about 16 million gallons of fuel annually 
(Boito, et al., 2016). This can be compared to the savings of a new engine as discussed in 
Chapters IV and V. These types of modifications are becoming more and more important 
as AF systems age. 
Some other reasons for engine upgrades are unrelated, or tangentially related, to 
costs savings, they may entail adding capabilities or improving readiness.  Either of these 
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types of modifications could increase or decrease costs and are trade-offs for the PM and 
higher leadership to decide, but their decision depends on quality analysis of what those 
trade-offs will cost.   
2.8 Chapter Conclusion 
O&S costs are expensive and increasing.  Many legacy systems are experiencing 
growth in O&S costs that will require mitigation. In the past, the DoD neglected proper 
analysis of the behavior of O&S costs, which has led to a recent increase in O&S studies.  
The reason for these studies is highlighted in Appendix C of the OSD CAPE Cost 
Estimating guide which provides an example of how O&S cost estimates can be an 
important input to a decision that is often faced by DoD, namely to replace a fleet now, or 
to upgrade the current fleet and defer replacement until later. One alternative, is to retire 
the legacy systems and replace with new; another alternative is to upgrade the legacy 
systems to extend the system service life.  For the first alternative, it is assumed that the 
procurement cost will be lower for a system upgrade than for a new replacement system. 
This assumption relies on a second level assumption that the new replacement system 
will have lower O&S costs due to improved reliability, performance or maintainability.  
In order to properly perform such an analysis, the quantifiable effects of a proposed 
modifications would need to be estimated and the answers to the research questions 
posed in Chapter I could direct such an analysis. 
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III: Data Collection and Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter documents the method of data collection and the required analysis to 
address the research questions from Chapter I.  We first discuss the process of data 
collection, screening, and standardization as well as the limitations and assumptions 
related to Air Force data collection methods.  We then discuss the methods used to 
compute and to compare cost and performance metrics.  Both descriptive and inferential 
analysis are used, with an emphasis on the descriptive analysis due to the small sample 
size.  Consequently, the proposed methods are more exploratory than confirmatory as 
discussed near the end of the chapter. 
3.2 Data Limitations 
The optimal approach to compare engine performance or cost would be by aircraft 
tail number in order to compare and to contrast specific aircraft before and after a new 
engine installation, which would minimize any other external factors.  Unfortunately, this 
ideal approach is impractical Air Force data collection systems.  Fuel consumption and 
flying hours are available by tail number based on the Fuel Automated System (FAS) and 
is available within AFTOC, but not engines.  Neither program offices nor AF data 
systems track modifications or engine upgrades by tail number.  Aside from 
programmatic information, such as fuel consumption and flying hours, sustainment costs 
are not available by engine at all.  Air Force Lines of Accounting do not isolate a 
particular tail number or engine.  The lowest level of direct data allocation is at the 
aircraft, or Mission Designation Series (MDS), level as captured by a combination of the 
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data elements, namely the Program Element Code (PEC), Operating Agency Code 
(OAC) or Resource Center/Cost Center (RC/CC). 
AFTOC compiles data into various “data cubes,” sometimes called “universes,” 
which encapsulates a category of costs.  In this research, the three principle data cubes 
are the CAPE 14 data cube, which contains the aggregate costs from financial systems, 
the Engine Programmatic data cube which reports fuel usage, flying hours etc. and the 
CAPE14 Engine Data Cube, hereafter just Engine data cube which attempts to match 
costs reported in the CAPE14 data cube to aircraft engines using a variety of business 
rules. There is no Line of Accounting element tied to engines, so the reported Engine data 
is approximated by using ratios from the REMIS (Resources Management Information 
Systems) flying hours and comparing them to CEMS (Consolidated Engine Management 
System) Engine Actuarial data (AFTOC fact sheet, 2017).  The engine cost information 
used in this research is are therefore approximations. 
Because of these limitations in how the Air Force collects source data, it is not 
possible to isolate the effects of new and old engines unless they belong to a separate 
MDS.  One example where this is the case, as highlighted in Chapter I, is with the C-5.  
The C-5A, B and C all use the TF39-GE-1 engine exclusively.  The new F138-GE-100 
engine was given its own MDS, the C-5M.  Only because of the creation of a new MDS, 
which is distinguished by the new engine, is it possible to compare the costs of the old 
engine with the new engine.  In the event that a new engine is not isolated to its own 
MDS, costs are estimated on a proportionate basis as reported by AFTOC Engine data 
cube.  This second approach introduces variation into the computation since it relies on 
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the assumption that the percentage of aircraft with newer engines equates to the same 
percentage of the flying hours for any particular MDS. 
3.3 Engine Inventory Analysis 
A first step for comparative analysis is to isolate aircraft platforms with more than 
one engine, in other words to generate a listing of MDS categories with more than one 
engine type/model/series (TMS).  For the purpose of this analysis, a MDS category is a 
shared airframe within a larger parent MDS, for example, the various aircraft sharing the 
C-130 airframe (i.e. AC-130, EC-130, etc.) would count as one MDS category under a 
parent MDS of C-130. AFTOC did not have an available report field to extract an 
inventory number of engines, but this information is available from CEMS, which is 
incorporated into AFTOC.  Therefore, the AFTOC helpdesk was able to compile a 
database of engine inventory by TMS, base, aircraft platform, and serial number. The 
available information covered 1996 to 2019. This is all the information required to 
determine which engines aligned to which MDS and if the inventory was increasing or 
decreasing over the timeframe. 
The resulting database contains inventory data by quarter and has over a million 
rows of data.  The initial database had 166 different MDSs and 65 distinct engines as 
designated by TMS. Approximately 250 rows had no associated aircraft and were 
deleted.  Much of the remaining database was not usable for the purposes of this analysis 
and therefore needed to be reduced to only the relevant aircraft as we discuss next.  Four 
of the MDSs were Air Cruise Missiles engines that are outside the scope of analysis and 
were excluded. 
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Helicopters have a lower O&S profile compared to fixed wing aircraft.  Using 
AFTOC total O&S numbers, helicopter O&S costs on average 18% of what fixed wing 
aircraft cost. Helicopter engines also operate in a fundamentally different manner than 
turbojet, turbofan, and turboprop engines as they generate lift through shaft power rather 
than thrust (MacIsaac & Langton, 2011).  Using the metric of gallons per flying hour (see 
Section 3.4 for the discussion of metrics used), Figure 3 shows that in flying hour terms, 
helicopters operate a full order of magnitude more efficiently than the fixed wing 
categories (the MC-12 was removed because of AFSOC reporting abnormality not 
relevant to the rest of this thesis).   
Figure 3: Gallons per Flying Hour by Aircraft Category 
Helicopters consist of 15 different MDSs and nine different Engines.  Only two 
engine systems experienced an increasing inventory over the time period, the CV-22B 
and the TH-1H.  The CV-22B entered into the service in 2006 and has no basis for 
comparison with other MDSs in AFTOC and this eliminates it from analysis.  The other 
new engine is the T53-L-703 associated with the UH-1H and the TH-1H, which is 
comparable to the T400-CP-400 on the UH-1H. The analysis between these models is 
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complicated by the fact that the TH-1H models are used in training where the usage 
profile could be expected to deviate from operational use. For these reasons, helicopters 
are analyzed separately from fixed wing aircraft in this analysis.  Within this research, 
aircraft refers to fixed wing aircraft and helicopters will be referred to as helicopters. 
Drones also have a distinct O&S profile from manned aircraft as they have no 
pilots and operate on a distinct system software.  Drones include 11 MDSs, which share 
ten engines.  They were examined separately from the rest of the database, however 
within the drone data there are no reengine modifications available for analysis and 
therefore drones were excluded from any further analysis. 
The data was then examined for a one-to-one relationship with a weapon system 
and an engine.  If a particular MDS category exclusively matched with only TMS, then 
those data points were excluded for not having two engines to compare performance.  
This removal represented almost a third of the total database representing 39 MDS 
variants and 18 associated TMSs.  The list of excluded engines and MDS are in Table 2.   
Table 2: Aircraft Excluded from Analysis for Lack of Comparison 
 
Despite initially passing the criteria of having more than one TMS engine within a 
MDS category, other aircraft (AC) were excluded from analysis.  The NC-130 variants 
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were removed since they were a prototype, were too small in inventory with a maximum 
of two aircraft, and were modified in such ways that the fuel efficiency would not be 
comparable with the other 130 variants.  Additionally, the EC-18 and E-8 category of 
aircraft were excluded from analysis despite the fact that they shared the TF33-PW-102 
engines with the C-135 models. The EC-18 aircraft has a sufficiently modified mission as 
well as an airframe design that would have separate effects on fuel efficiency; the nose of 
the aircraft has a different aerodynamic shape and holds distinct equipment.  The KC-
135A and the C-137B and C were excluded since there were no active aircraft of these 
types during the period of analysis. 
Upon first glance, the B-52H appears to have two engines, the TF33-103 and the 
TF33-PW-3.  The later engine is not mentioned within the Engine Handbook.  Upon 
request, AFLCMC researched the engines for analysis and revealed identical 
specifications between the two engines.  This led to a request to the System Program 
Office (SPO) which confirmed that the two engines are the same (C. Honious, personal 
communication, Dec 10, 2019).  With this information, the B-52H was removed from 
analysis.  
 Problems in the source data led to the exclusion of the F-4 categories of Aircraft.  
The Fuel Automated System (FAS) underreported the F-4 fuel consumption and this is a 
known deficiency documented by AFTOC in a 30 August 2019 factsheet. This error leads 
to an unreliable measure of fuel consumption, even going into negative amount of fuel 
per flying hour in 2004.  Because of this deficiency in the source data, the F-4 and its 
variants were altogether eliminated from further analysis. 
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After all these exclusions, only five MDS categories remain, the various C-130s, 
C-135s, F-15s, F-16s, and the C-5s.  One of the C-130 engines, TF33-PW-105, is a very 
low inventory engine, reaching six engines at its peak, which means it would correspond 
to at most one aircraft.  Because of this small effect size, it was excluded.  The remaining 
categories include 17 engines and 80 MDSs.  The MDS breakout includes two fighter 
aircraft, the F-15 and F-16, and three categories of cargo aircraft/refuelers, the various C-
5, C-130 and C-135 variants such as the KC-135.  Of the 17 engines, only three are new 
engines that the Air Force introduced into the Air Force inventory since 1996, the F138-
GE-100 on the C-5M (in FY2010), the AE2100 on various C-130”J” models (in 
FY2016), and the F108-GE-201 on various C-135 models (in FY2001).  Seven of the 17 
Engines fully phased out or retired.  
Summarizing this section, Table 3 is the inclusion/exclusion table that shows the 
criteria used to find the MDS to engine pairings used in the subsequent AFTOC data 
pulls described in Section 3.4.   Appendix A contains a table listing the aircraft and 
engines considered in the analysis, including the last 42 exclusions. The Total Inventory 
column in Appendix A is not a count of the engines but is an inventory over time. That is, 
if a particular engine serial number was in use from 1996-2018, then it would have been 
counted each year and would account for 23 in the Total Inventory column.  
 For helicopters, the only pairing that could be found among helicopters with four 
or more PAA with more than one engine is the T53-L-703 and T53-L-13 on the  UH-1H 
and the TH-1H, which is comparable UH-1N which operates on the older, but still in 
service, T400-CP-400 TMS.  
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Table 3: Inclusion/Exclusion Table from Engine Analysis 
 
Table 4 contains a listing of the specifications of the engines used in the analysis.  
Engine specifications are available from the 2014 Engine Handbook as prepared by the 
Director of Propulsion from the AFLCMC.  In some cases, such as the max thrust for the 
T56-A-7B, the data was not available in the Engine Handbook.  Table 5 is a similar 
listing for the Helicopter engines, where the T53-L-13 is not in the Engine Handbook. 
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Table 4: Aircraft Engine Specifications from Engine Handbook 
 
Table 5: Helicopter Engine Specifications from Engine Handbook 
 
3.4 AFTOC Data pulls 
The query for engine costs required three pulls from separate databases within 
AFTOC.  In the first, programmatic information was pulled in order to find the PAA of 
the MDSs listed in Appendix B.  The purpose of this was to investigate for aircraft with a 
PAA of less than five in order to exclude them, as already seen in Table 3.  In other 
words, if the Air Force did not operate at least five of a particular MDS in any of the 
years under consideration, then that MDS platform was excluded. Aircraft with a small 
PAA may have an overly influential effect in the database as errors will have a larger 
effect and any fixed effects within the figures will have a greater impact.  Using this 
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exclusion criteria, the analysis was able to eliminate 24 of the C-135 variants reducing 
the analysis to five, while keeping approximately 95% of the C-135 aircraft (mostly KC-
135s) in consideration. From here the analysis centers on the 38 remaining MDSs as 
shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Aircraft MDSs with 5 or more PAA 
 
The second AFTOC data pull was from the Engine Programmatic data cube.  This 
data cube contains the fuel costs, flying hours from REMIS, and fuel usage from the Fuel 
Automated System (FAS) and pulled only for those MDSs in Table 3. There are no costs 
in this data cube; so it will be used to compute and to compare performance metrics only 
as discussed in Chapter IV, sections two through seven.  In the analysis in Chapter IV, 
outliers from this metric can be removed.  While it is possible an aircraft has a fuel leak 
or some other reason for wild changes in performance, large outliers are not expected and 
are likely traced to errors in the source data. 
AFTOC created the Engine data cube in response to field requests to track O&S 
costs by engines.  Those costs which are directly attributable to an engine should appear 
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here.  However, it is important to realize that not all engine costs can be tied directly to an 
engine and are therefore not captured within this cube.  Of significant note is that CLS 
costs are not reported in the engine data cube, which will serve to severely underestimate 
the costs and therefore any savings that are analyzed in Chapter IV.   
3.5 How Metrics are Considered  
 It would be unfair to compare fuel costs without normalizing for usage.  If 
operations tempo increases over time, then costs will vary in accordance with that usage 
instead of the engine.  In order to isolate the effects of the engine costs the most efficient 
metric available within the database is the number of gallons used divided by the number 
of flying hours.  Using the metric of Gallons / Flying Hour (fuel consumption) should 
have the effect of creating a homogeneous comparison as long as the comparison is 
within similar aircraft in the same MDS category. If all else could be held equal, changes 
in Gallons / Flying Hour would be reasonably well isolated to the new engine. 
Unfortunately, the comparison cannot be perfect since there will be errors in the 
data and measuring inefficiencies.  Even if these did not exist, all else cannot be held 
constant since fuel efficiency varies by altitude, atmosphere conditions, and cruise speed 
(Rolls Royce, 2005 pg 75), none of which are captured within AFTOC. Aircraft with few 
flying hours may have a distorted Gallon / Flying Hour metric caused by the fuel used in 
take-off and landings and taxiing, especially since flying hours are in the denominator of 
the metric. Since this analysis attempts to quantify the effects of average usage, aircraft 
with fewer than 20 flying hours by fiscal year were removed.  This removal represented 
1063 flying hours out of 18 million. In addition, four data points also showed zero or no 
fuel usage and were removed. 
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Maintenance costs are normalized to base year 2019 in order to remove the effects 
of inflation. While maintenance costs do vary by flying hour in the same way that 
mileage affects automotive maintenance, the number of aircraft is even more important 
for cost normalization. In accordance with a RAND 2015 study, PAI is inherently more 
stable than flying hours and is the preferred metric by subject matter experts.  This thesis 
uses PAI to normalize maintenance costs within MD categories (Boito, et al. 2015).  In 
summary, the metrics used are Gallon / Flying Hour for performance metrics, and for 
maintenance costs it will be BY2019 Maintenance costs / PAI excluding CLS. 
3.6 Statistical Method Employed 
 In all cases the data is first visually observed in order to remove outliers where 
appropriate and to gauge the sense of the differences in the engines.  Graphs and 
statistical tests are generated using the statistical software program JMP 13 Pro. The most 
common test for comparing differences in means is a student t-test, however this method 
is inappropriate when the underlying distributions are non-normal.  Therefore, we follow 
visual examinations of the data with the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, also called the Rank 
Sums test. This non-parametric method does not require normality and provides more 
robust comparisons in addition to being less susceptible to outliers. The chosen α of 0.10 
as stated in Chapter I is applied to all Rank Sum tests. 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
In order to quantify costs, we must first determine comparable MDSs that share a 
similar aircraft frame but that operate on two or more engines.  Only five categories of 
MDSs met this requirement, with only three of them having new engines since 1999, all 
three on cargo aircraft.  Seven engines retired over this time frame, which introduces the 
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two fighter aircraft into the analysis. Lastly, among helicopters, only one engine is 
present creating another pairing. The data analysis is limited to these engines. 
This chapter started with a discussion of the limitations in how the AFTOC 
system collects O&S data.  The lowest level of data available is at the MDS level, which 
does not allow for pinpoint accuracy on the effects of modifications or engines; that data 
is simply not available.  The engine data cube does approximate engine costs based on 
time on wing ratios, but it excludes some major expenses, most significantly CLS. 
In contrast to those limitations on cost, performance metrics are discernable at the 
engine level since data is collected this way.  Here the performance in fuel efficiency can 
be calculated and gallons saved per flying hours along with cost savings can be calculated 
from that.  In Chapter IV we present the findings from the data cubes created for analysis 
in this chapter. 
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IV: Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the results of the analysis.  Except where noted, descriptive 
patterns for engines are grouped into three broad color-coded categories: red for new 
engines, green for retired engines, and blue for engines that are active over the whole 
study period.  For the performance metrics, the data is first examined for outliers, which 
will be removed.  Then, by MD category we visually show the graphs of the data for fuel 
performance metrics (Gallon / Flying Hour) to observe the effects of new engines. 
Following that is a discussion of the results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistical tests.  
After examining fuel performance metrics, we investigate the MD categories by 
maintenance costs associated with their engines and limitations.  The Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test is used again to statistically test and quantity the differences between the engine 
categories. 
4.2 Fuel Performance Characteristics of C-130 Models 
In Figure 4 we can see the outliers removed from the C-130s.  Only the figures 
showing MD category are shown within this analysis.  Outliers for each MD category are 
further examined within the specific TMS and MDS to ensure that they are outliers.  
Outliers are determined by visual examination on the relative effect they have on the 
trend line within their category. While engine fuel performance does vary, large outliers 
are more likely the result of faulty data collection, such as an underreporting of flying 
hours, instead of actual fuel performance of the engine and as such are excluded.  
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Figure 4: C-130 Outliers Removed 
Figure 5 highlights the LC-130 models whose performance is atypical.  The LC-
130H operates in the Antarctic and has skis instead of landing gear, which explains why 
its fuel efficiency metrics appear to be different.  In order to capture the mean 
performance of the T56-A-15 engine, which is on multiple C-130 variants, the LC-130 
was removed from the analysis.  
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Figure 5: Atypical Fuel Performance of the LC-130 
Figure 6 shows the final chart of C-130 performance with the outliers from Figure 
4, and the LC-130 from Figure 5 removed.  The new engines, (belonging to the –J 
models) are in red and appear to have a lower gallon per flying hour than the other C-130 
models.  The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test results are shown in Table 7. 
 
35 
 
Figure 6: C-130 Models Fuel Performance Metrics 
Table 7: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results of C-130 Fuel Performance
 
Each test is statistically significant suggesting that there is a difference between 
each of the categories of engines at the α of 0.10.  The score mean difference between the 
retired and the new is 12.9, which means that the retired engine’s performance is higher 
on average.  Since it has a higher Gallon / Flying Hour ratio the new engine is more fuel 
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efficient.  The Hodges-Lehmann column is the estimated median performance difference. 
In this case the new engine is performing more fuel effiecnetly on average by 42.4 
gallons per flying hour, with a 90% confidence that we captured the real performance 
improvement between 28.8 to 60.6 fewer gallons per flying hour.  The interpretation for 
the other two lines is the same with the exception that the sign is negative.  Focusing on 
the last row, the new engine scored a negative 108 when compared to an engine 
encompassing the full period. This lower Wilcoxon Rank Sum score reflects better fuel 
performance measured by fewer gallons used per flying hour.  Using the Hodges-
Lehmann value in the last row of Table 7, each flying hour on the full period engine 
(T56-A-15) is burning an additional 115 gallons of fuel when compared to the new 
engine (AE-2100) in median fuel performance. 
4.3 Fuel Performance Characteristics of C-135 Models 
 Three data points on the C-135s were deleted as shown in Figure 7.  There are a 
cluster of data points below one of the removed outliers belonging to the new engine.  
Since there are five data points in the same general region they were not be removed 
using the justification of an error in data collection/reporting and further investigation is 
warranted.  The cluster belongs to the RC-135V/W models and when overlaid by using 
command (and not engine status) as can be seen in Figure 8, it is observed that Air Force 
Material Command (AFMC) appears to have a distinctive fuel performance profile 
compared to Air Combat Command (ACC).  This may be explained by how AFMC is 
using the engines in a testing environment.  In order to isolate the effect of the fuel 
performance in operational use of the engines the data points in the AFMC cluster were 
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also excluded for Figure 9.  A further discussion of fuel usage by Command is in Chapter 
V and Appendix C. 
 
Figure 7: C-135 Outliers Removed  
Figure 9 shows the performance of the various C-135 models. Of note, there are 
three engines comprising the retired category.  The performance of all three are still 
within a relatively small range with the two outliers removed.  The fuel performance is 
not clearly lower than full period engine from the figure. 
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Figure 8: C-135 Fuel Performance by Command 
 
Figure 9: C-135 Models Fuel Performance Metrics 
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Since the missions of C-135 models are distinct (refueling versus reconnaissance) 
it makes more sense to compare them by sub-MDS categories as seen in Figures 10 and 
11.  Figure 10 is for the KC-135E (using the retired engine) compared with the KC-
135R/T.  Figure 11 is of the RC-135V/W, in Figure 11 the overlay is by engine instead of 
since they transition from three engines to one. Once broken down in sub categories the 
fuel efficiency performance is clearly distinguishable as compared to Figure 9. 
 
Figure 10: KC-135E and KC-135R/T Fuel Performance Metrics 
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Figure 11: RC-135V/W Fuel Performance Metrics 
We can see in the fuel performance metrics that for each pair, the retired engines 
appear to be acheving a poorer Gallon / Flying Hour than the full period or new engine 
since the green line is on top of the red line.  Table 8 shows the results of statistical tests 
by MDS pairs and confirms the visual with the statistically significant conlcusion that the 
Air Force is using a more fuel efficient engine.  The interpretation follows the same as 
the C-130s discussed in Section 4.2.  Here, the full period engine on the KC-135s are, in 
estimated median performance, using 110.9 to 217.6 fewer gallons per flying hour than 
the retured engine and the results are statisitically significant. 
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Table 8: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results of C-135 Fuel Performance 
 
4.4 Fuel Performance Characteristics of C-5 Models 
 The C-5 is the clearest comparison since there are only three MDSs and one MDS 
(C-5M) corresponding to only one engine.  Figure 12 shows the outliers removed from 
analysis.  The outliers are especially large and are likely related to errors in data 
collection at the source. 
 
Figure 12: C-5 Model Outliers Removed 
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  Figure 13 shows the performance of the C-5 models.  It can be observed that the 
new C-5 engine is performing better than the retired engine.  There is an interesting dip in 
FY 2002, which shows better performance in that year.  The reason for this is unclear, but 
an observation of the other performance figures shows a similar pattern.  Possible 
explanations could be over reporting in flying hours or underreporting in fuel.  This could 
be further researched.  
 
Figure 13: C-5 Model Fuel Performance Metrics 
 Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistics can be seen in Table 9.  When the retired engine is 
compared with the new, the positive score mean difference implies that the retired engine 
consumed more fuel than the new one.  The result is statistically significant with the 
estimated fuel savings being between 116.7 to 216.7 gallons per flying hour. 
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Table 9: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results of C-5 Performance 
 
4.5 Fuel Performance Characteristics of F-15 Models  
Three outliers identifed in Figure 14 were removed from analysis.  In the analysis 
of the F-15s, and later in the F-16s, there are no new engines, just retired engines. 
 
Figure 14: F-15 Model Outliers Removed 
 The performance metrics for the F-15 models can be seen in Figure 15.  In a 
reversal from the observations of the Cargo/Tanker aircraft, here the green line is below 
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the blue, suggesting that the retired engine was more fuel efficient than the engines being 
used currently. 
 
Figure 15: F-15 Model Fuel Performance Metrics 
The F-15 category also contains the F-15E, which has neither a new engine nor a 
retired engine.  It does have two engines for the whole period from 1999-2019, which 
allows for a comparasion between them to be made and for completeness it is included 
the analysis.  Figure 16 shows the F-15E on the right along side the F-15C and D in order 
to show the different fuel efficience of the F-15E.  The A and B models were left off the 
chart for presentation but the performance of those engines are comparable with the C 
and D. In Figure 16 it appears that, in terms of fuel efficiency, the F100-PW-220 
outperforms the F100-PW-229. 
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Figure 16: F-15E Fuel Performance Metrics Compared to F-15C/D 
 Table 10 confirms the visual patterns that the F100-PW-229 performs less fuel 
efficiently.  It has an estimated difference of 53 more gallons per flying hour. 
Table 10: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results of F-15E Performance
 
The results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the remaining F-15 models are 
shown in Table 11 and show that the retired engines may have a lower score mean, 
meaning better fuel efficiency but the results are not statistically signficant with a P value 
of .46 making it unable to reach a conclusion with a 90% confidence.   
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Table 11: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Reults of F-15A-D Performance
 
4.6 Fuel Performance Characteristics of F-16 Models 
   
 
Figure 17: F-16 Model Outliers Removed 
Five outliers were removed from the F-16 performance metrics as can be seen in 
Figure 17.  Within the F-16s, only the A/B models have a retired engine, while the C/D 
models share four engines that all operate over the entire time period, but can still be 
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tested in the same way that the F-15E is tested.  Figures 18 and 19 show the relevant 
model pairings side by side. In the A/B models the retired engine appears to be more fuel 
efficient, but no patterns are evident in the C/D pairing. 
 
Figure 18: F-16A/B Fuel Performance Metrics 
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Figure 19: F-16C/D Fuel Performance Metrics 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for the F-16s are shown in Table 12. The F-16A/B 
model engines are in the first row, with a black line separating the F-16C/D models. 
While some of the test results on the C/D models are significant, the magnitude is not that 
large with the best performing engine consumes 33 fewer gallons per flying hour.   
Table 12: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Reults of F-16A-D Performnace
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4.7 Fuel Performance Metrics for Helicopters 
 Within the helicopter performance, the UH-1H from 2010-2014 was excluded 
from analysis due to having only 2 PAA, low levels of flying hours, and minimal levels 
of maintenance.  Figure 20 shows the performance with a clear difference of a lower 
gallon per flying hour for the new aircraft showing it is significant.  The Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test is significant and confirms that the new engine performs better as can be seen in 
Table 13. However, these results are complicated as new engines are predominantly on 
trainers. 
 
Figure 20: Fuel Performance Metrics for Helicopters 
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Table 13: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results for Helicopter Fuel Performance 
 
4.8 Summary of Fuel Performance Metrics 
 Within the cargo aircraft, new engines appear to be more fuel efficient than old 
engines.  With each engine comparison of the cargo aircraft, the tests were statistically 
significant and represented better efficiency of the aircraft.  With a 90% confidence 
interval of the estimated location of performance, the gallons of fuel per flying hour 
saved ranges from a low of 28 (C-130s), to a high of 280 (RC-135s).  For the fighter 
aircraft not all results were statistically significant.  For those that were, the range of the 
estimated confidence intervals from 3 to 90 gallons per flying hour.  No new engines 
were in this later group though. 
 Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median, range, etc.) of the MD 
category and the engine, as well as the total flying hours since 1999.  Using Table 14 the 
average of the T56A15 engine on the C-130 category is 821, which is compared to the 
average of the AE2100 new engine of 703.  This represents a point estimate of 107 fewer 
gallons per flying hour.  Using that average and multiplying by the 352K flying hours 
represents 41.6M gallons of fuel saved. Similar calculation for the C-5 results in 15.7M 
gallons saved.  For the new C-135 engine, the comparison is made against the average of 
the three engines it replaced (the TF33-PW models).   The three new engines represent 
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$279M in savings using 2019 fuel prices. Table 15 is a similar to Table 14 but for 
helicopters. 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Aircraft Fuel Performance Metrics 
 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Helicopter Fuel Performance Metrics 
 
4.9 Maintenance Costs Limitations 
 Maintenance costs are significantly more difficult to normalize than fuel 
performance metrics.  Maintenance costs are more variable with higher coefficients of 
variation and larger outliers.  This makes it difficult to detect any outliers that should be 
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removed and consequently none were.  The AFTOC engine cost cube does not include 
CLS costs, which serve to underestimate total costs, an acknowledged limitation in the 
data.  This is complicated by the fact that CLS costs generally are growing as a 
percentage of maintenance costs (Ritschel and Ritschel, 2016). Figure 21 provides a 
visual representation of the scale of this limitation but needs to be interpreted with 
caution as it is not taken from the same source data as the remainder of the charts.  Figure 
21 comes from AFTOC’s Weapon System data cube converted to Base Year 2019.  It 
includes the maintenance costs of the 38 MDSs in this study taken as an aggregate and is 
only used here to show the growth of CLS both in dollar amounts and as a percentage of 
maintenance.  These costs correspond to all maintenance costs on the weapon systems 
and not just engines since the Weapon System data cube does not have a breakout for 
engine costs. CLS is in red.  Table 16 provides further evidence that CLS is more 
prevalent on new engines; Table 16 shows the average amount of CLS as a percentage of 
maintenance for each MD category by engine status if the engine corresponded to a new 
MDS (C-5M and C-130”J” models).  Since the F-15 and F-16s contain no new engines 
the F-22 and F-35 are included in Table 16 to provide an indication of how much CLS is 
being used to support the newer platforms.   
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Figure 21: Maintenance and CLS Costs of the 28 Aircraft MDSs 
Table 16: Average Percentage of Maintenance that is Performed via CLS
 
When analyzing for fuel performance, a standard metric of Gallons / Flying Hour 
is homogenous.  In analyzing maintenance costs, there is not an obvious way to 
normalize the data.  Costs in maintenance could vary by flying hour but could also vary 
based on the number of planes in inventory in the same way that the maintenance on a 
fleet of cars varies both in how much they are driven and how many cars are in the fleet.  
The number of planes is an appropriate measure to use when comparing across aircraft 
systems since the inventory is more stable over time than flying hours (Boito et al., 
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2015).  However since this research is looking at costs within the same weapon system 
we have chosen to use BY 2019 costs divided by PAA divided by Flying Hours to 
capture both usage and quantity.   
 Another aspect that complicates the analysis of maintenance is the effect of aging.  
Over time engines will likely cost more to maintain through the accumulation of wear 
and tear as well as obsolete parts and supply chains.  Engines maintenance costs are 
theorized to follow a bathtub effect where costs are higher in the beginning due to initial 
learning or defects, reach a lower steady state and then the ending with higher costs due 
to the aging effect. (Kiley, G. T., & Skeen, J., 2001).  The best comparison of engine 
costs would be to compare base year costs from steady-state of one engine to the steady-
state the other.  Unfortunately, this comparison is not possible using AFTOC as the data 
source.  Referring back to Table 4, there are only three new engines with 10, 9 or 5 years 
from when they initially entered inventory and fewer years from when they become 
widely used.  Only one engine, the F108-GE-201, has 20 or more flying hours before 
2010.  Given how long the Air Force keeps engines in inventory, AFTOC’s 21 years of 
data does not capture a large enough time frame to compare steady operations.  And what 
is available is understated because CLS is not reported as an engine cost. 
 A final note for the limitations with the Engine Data Cube is that the F-15A/B, F-
15C/D, F-16A/B and F-16C/D MDS model pairs are grouped together and the individual 
costs for each aircraft is not known.  There are additionally some TMS costs for the 
F100-PW-100 mapped to the F-15 without the model destination.  This analysis adds 
these costs to the C/D models, which is the predominate user of the engine. 
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4.10 Maintenance Costs of New, Retired and Full Period Engines 
Figures 22 and 23 are not colored by engine status but instead are colored by MD 
category.  The three sections represent the retired engines on the left, those operating over 
the full period in the middle, and the new engines on the right.  Figure 22 shows the 
manpower maintenance costs (CAPE 1.2) and Figure 23 shows the 3.0 maintenance 
costs, which are repair parts, depot level maintenance and engine overhauls.  These 
figures have no data points excluded, however the scale was adjusted to show the patterns 
that would otherwise be obscured by large outliers.  Figure 22 is cut off at $100 per 
Flying Hour per PAA, and Figure 23 is cut off at $300 per Flying Hour per PAA. 
 
Figure 22: CAPE 1.2 Engine Maintenance Costs by MD Category 
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 Figure 23: CAPE 3.1-3.4 Engine Maintenance Costs by MD Category 
The intention of these two figures is to show the scale and variability of the 
maintenance costs, and that the maintenance cost on the new engines is significantly 
lower compared to the other engines.  This is likely a result of the aging factor and the 
incomplete ramp up of the new engines.  In both figures many of the costs appear to be 
around zero as a result of the scale of some of the other MD categories. 
Another observation from Figures 22 and 23 is that maintenance costs, especially 
manpower, precede and succeed usage.  Engines not in use incur costs, while retired 
engines continue to accrue costs well beyond usage.  In an attempt to remove this effect 
engines costs in the year of retirement onward, and prior to the year of inception were 
removed in subsequent maintenance charts.  Of particular note, the C-130J models have a 
discrepancy between the usage reported in the Engine Programmatic cube, which shows 
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usage only from 2016 onwards and the Weapon System Cost cube which shows usage 
from 1999 onwards; in this analysis we opted to use the Engine Programmatic data.  An 
investigation into the discrepancy is ongoing with the AFTOC helpdesk. 
4.11 Maintenance Cost Results by MD category 
Once the exclusions are made for engine maintenance costs, which occurred 
outside of their usage, we are left with 645 data points.   Since the presentation of this 
data is primarily visual, graphs with large outliers distort the visual to such an extent that 
it obscures patterns.  For that reason, outliers more than three standard deviations from 
the mean (within their respective MDS and TMS) are excluded in Figures 24-28. This 
represented 12 data points; a further discussion of these data points and some graphs and 
data statistics and are included in Appendix C. With these last data points removed we 
now examine Figures 24-28, which are the normalized maintenance costs by MD 
categories. These costs are for total maintenance costs, so both 1.2 and the 3.0 categories. 
Figure 24: Maintenance Costs of the C-130 Models 
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 Figure 25: Maintenance Costs of the C-135 Models 
 Figure 26: Maintenance Costs of the C-5 Models 
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 Figure 27: Maintenance Costs of the F-15 Models 
 Figure 28: Maintenance Costs of the F-16 Models 
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The results are mixed.  Within the C-130 models both the retired and the new 
engines appear cheaper to operate.  Within the C-5s, the new engines were initially more 
expensive, but the costs quickly fell to lower levels (consistent with the bathtub concept).  
With the F-15s the retired engines appear somewhat higher but it is inconclusive from the 
diagram.  For the F-16 models the retired engine appears to have been less expensive to 
operate, although that may be the result of some unusual outliers.  The most interesting 
results are from the C-135 models; here the new engine appears much more expensive.  
Similar to the fuel performance section, the C-135s are further investigated by breaking 
them into their MDS.  Figures 29 and 30 shows the results by MDS which reveals the 
potential source of the higher engine maintenance costs. 
Figure 29: KC-135 Model Maintenance Costs 
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Figure 30: RC-135 Model Maintenance Costs 
From these two figures, the differences in costs are not as pronounced as what is 
observed in Figure 25.  Despite being normalized by base year, the costs show upward 
trends; Figure 29 shows the KC-135s, and interesting there appear to be some 
maintenance costs, especially on the KC-135R, that were assigned to the wrong engine.  
The dollar figures were very small and were excluded; similar analysis was performed on 
all MDSs and 27 more data points were excluded, for a total of 39.  The retired engines 
on the KC-135E are more expensive than the KC-135R, but because of the variability in 
the KC-135T the results are inconclusive.  For Figure 30, the engines appear to be around 
the same maintenance costs, and then the new engines experience increases in costs in the 
later years. 
Each engine within the MD category was tested using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
test.  Table 17 contains the listing of comparisons that were not significant at the 0.10 
level.  None of the F-15 tests were significant.  Table 18, contains the results of the 
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Wilcoxon Rank Sum test that were significant at the 0.10 level.  Where a new engine is 
compared to an engine it replaced the line is bolded. For the fighter jets, the estimated 
saving are very small, the highest median difference as computed by the Hodges-
Lehmann is $2.67 per flying hour per aircraft.  Table 19 shows only the new engines 
compared against the engine they replace with the exception of the F108GE201 and 
TF33PW9 since it was statistically insignificant.  Where available, Table 19 is 
supplemented with the average amount of support that the aircraft receive as a percentage 
of CLS computed by taking the average from 1999-2019 reported in AFTOC.  This was 
possible for the C-5 and C-130 since the new engines correspond to MDSs.  However, it 
is not known how much CLS is spent on engines or on other aircraft maintenance 
activities.  Since the new and retired engines on the RC-135 models do not have distinct 
MDSs the percentage of CLS is estimated based on averages from 2000-2003 
(predominately retired engines) and 2004 to 2019 (predominately new engines). 
Table 17: Statistically Insignificant Test Results of Maintenance Costs  
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Table 18: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results for Aircraft Maintenance Costs  
  
Table 19: New Engines Compared to Replaced Engine Maintenance Costs  
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As discussed in Section 4.8 the limitations in the data impact the results. 
Generally, the data available reveals that a new engine is less expensive to maintain, with 
the exception that the F108GE201 tested as more expensive than the TF33PW105, but 
not the TF33PW5, all of which belong to the RC-135V/W. When computing for fuel 
performance these models required the removal of AFMC. For both the C-130 and the C-
5 more maintenance was performed by CLS on the aircraft with new engines than on the 
old engines.  
Table 20 contains the descriptive statistics of the data with mean, median, 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation of each engine by MD category.  Table 20 
is computed without the 39 exclusions discussed earlier in this section, and in Appendix 
C.  The maintenance costs are inclusive of CAPE 1.2 as well the 3.0 categories recorded 
in AFTOC (CAPE 3.1 through 3.4).  The new engines, along with the engines they are 
meant replace, are displayed next to each other and are in bold print.  The costs are 
normalized by Base Year 2019 and PAA / FH.  Of note is the high coefficient of 
variations that remain even with the removal of the 12 data points that were over three 
standard deviations from the mean. 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics of Aircraft Maintenance Costs  
 
4.12 Maintenance Cost Results for Helicopters 
 The maintence costs of helicopters are displayed in Figure 29 and shows that the 
newer aircraft appear significantly cheaper.  Unlike fixed wing Aircraft, Figure 29 only 
shows the results of the CAPE category 3 costs and not unit level maintenacne (CAPE 
1.2).  The reasons for the ommision is because unit level maintenance for training aircraft 
is not available in AFTOC, and this can be seen in the descriptive statitics provided in 
Table 21.  Lastly, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is available in Table 22 and the results 
are significant at the α level of 0.10. 
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Figure 31: CAPE 3.0 Maintenance Costs for Helicopters 
Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Helicopter Maintenance Costs 
 
Table 22: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results for Helicopter Maintenance Costs
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4.13 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter each MD category and helicopters available are graphically and 
descriptively examined for fuel efficiency performance and maintenance costs.  The 
comparison for fuel efficiencies generally show improvement in fuel performance with 
statistically significant results when compared to older engines. The same is true for 
maintenance costs within the available data. 
We addressed some of the limitations that complicate the analysis, especially 
within the maintenance costs. In the course of this analysis, we found statistically 
significant results at the 0.10 confidence level that are visible in the graphs of the engine 
performance.  In Chapter V we conclude the thesis with a discussion of the research 
questions, some lessons learned and a discussion of the implications of the research.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter we answer the research questions posed in Chapter I.  After that we 
discuss the significance of the research and conclusions.  In addition to broader 
implications of the research, we use a case study for the performance cost savings that 
could be materialized using the recent reengine efforts from the E-8 (JSTARS) aircraft.  
We conclude with recommendations for future action and research.  
5.2 Investigative Questions Answered  
1). What are the quantifiable effects of an engine upgrade to the ongoing O&S 
costs of a weapon system? Only three new engines were able to be analyzed on aircraft, 
AE-2100 on the C-130”J” models, the F138-GE-100 on the C-5M, and the F108-CF-201 
on the RC135 models.  One new engine was available in the data for helicopters, the T53-
L-703.   Seven engines were retired on various MDSs including fighter and cargo aircraft 
as seen in Table 4. Engine fuel performance is measurable with the available data and is 
capable of being normalized.  The difference in fuel performance is statistically 
significant in almost all cases with the exception of the retired F100-PW-100 compared 
to the newer F100-PW-220.  Fuel performance is rated better in the estimated range of 28 
to 280 fewer gallons per flying hour on cargo aircraft.  Maintenance costs are difficult to 
quantify as costs available by engine are approximated and do not include CLS, and 
using AFTOC data steady-state to steady-state comparisons are not available.  From the 
data that is available, maintenance costs on new engines are significantly lower than the 
engines they are replacing.   
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2). How do these effects vary across different weapon systems? Only cargo, 
refuelers and fighter aircraft could be analyzed.  Compared to the retired fighter jet 
engine, fuel efficiencies are either not statistically different or are more costly for fighter 
aircraft, suggesting that other characteristics of the engine, such as thrust, power or 
reliability were determined to be more important.  Helicopters followed the same fuel 
performance pattern as cargo aircraft, where the increase to other engine performance 
characteristics still resulted with improved to fuel efficiency.  
3). To what extent do historical data have predictive capacity for future O&S cost 
estimates? In most cases, the p-values from the various Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests are 
usually less than 0.0001, suggesting a high statistical significance. This suggests that the 
observed differences seen in the graphs are predictive of what fuel savings are attainable.  
Point estimates for fuel savings on aircraft can be computed by comparing the average of 
one engine with another is possible by examining Tables 4 and 14.  Tests regarding 
engine maintenance costs also had low p-values which normally suggest predictive 
ability, but the limitations in how the data are collected raise doubts to their reliability 
and interpretation, namely the inability of tracing CLS costs to engines and the inability 
of comparing engines at steady-state since there are only four new engines. More studies 
will be required as new engines reach steady-state.  The early indications are that 
maintenance costs are lower for replaced engines and the savings are potentially 
significant.   
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5.3 Significance of Research 
Within the cargo aircraft, we observed large improvements in fuel efficiencies. 
This happened despite an increase in the power of the engines as captured in Table 4.  In 
terms of maintenance, they appear to be cheaper to operate, although this will take time 
to fully capture the extent of these savings. In essence, the Air Force has perhaps enjoyed 
the best of both worlds, higher quality performance for a lower price.  How did this 
happen?  The answer could be in the advancement of technology compared to the age of 
our engines.  Our aircraft are old (Heritage, 2019) with some aircraft, such as the B-52, 
already in their mid to late sixties.  While the engines are not always as old as the aircraft, 
we can infer that with only three new TMS engines in over 20 years, the engines are too 
old to compete in performance and cost with modern technology both in terms of 
maintenance costs and fuel consumption.  
In financial terms, the cost of a new engine should be compared to the present 
value of the potential savings.  This thesis has only looked at one side of that equation, 
how much can we expect in potential savings.   Recently, because of the state of the B-
52H, a new engine was necessary in order to keep the aircraft operational, but the 
evidence suggests that the decision to purchase new engines may save significant sums in 
fuel and maintenance.  
The JSTARS were in the process of acquiring new engines, with $160M in then 
year dollars on RDT&E from 2007 to 2011 based on the President’s Budget in those 
years.  However, the acquisition of the engines has not yet materialized.  The JSTARS 
operate on the TF33-P-102C with similar characteristics to the TF33-PW-102 which was 
analyzed in this study. If the JSTARS had new engines with similar fuel consumption as 
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the F108-GE-201, then (from Table 4) a point estimate for the average fuel savings 
would be 348 gallons per flying hour.  Using AFTOC data over the last six years the 
JSTARS have averaged 8,100 flying hours per year, which equates to 2.8 million gallons 
of fuel a year.  Using the 2020 DLA standard rate for JP-8 of $2.96 per gallon, this 
represents $8.3M of savings per year.   Using a conservative 2% inflation rate, the 
savings in fuel has a present value of $136M over 20 years.  Given how long engines stay 
in inventory, 20 years may also prove to be conservative. Additionally, the maintenance 
savings would add to this figure. The increased reliability and performance upgrades 
would be a bonus. 
5.4 Recommendations for Action and Future Research 
Acquisition cost research is well studied, and cost analysts create estimates for 
each new ACAT program.  The O&S side of the estimate is less researched and more 
uncertain.  This research helps to fill in that gap for some aircraft engines.  For those 
engines that the Air Force is considering replacing, decision makers need reliable 
information in order to understand the trade-offs.  Part of that trade-off comes in the form 
of more capabilities, but maintenance and fuel performance are measurable and also need 
to be taken into account. 
Research like this is hampered by the availability of data.  Originally, the scope of 
this thesis was on modifications generally.  However, that data is not available.  Costs are 
not tracked at a low enough level to compare the performance of tail numbers.  The 
lowest level that costs can be tied to is by MDS or engine, which is where this research 
was forced to focus. It is not known (in an accessible manner) when any particular 
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aircraft has been modified or is awaiting modification.  Program offices do not track 
modifications with this level of granularity and neither do Air Force data entry systems.   
Since the past is the best predictor of the future, it would behoove the Air Force to track 
costs at lower levels. 
Our engines are old and have reached the point where the trade-off in 
performance on cargo aircraft comes at a reduction in costs instead of an addition to 
costs. Future research should be able to further bear this out.  A more exact estimate of 
savings could be accomplished if an analyst were able to exam the costs per aircraft and 
normalize by metrics other than flying hours, such as cargo load or distance of sortie. A 
root cause analysis for the lower fuel performance deviations that were noted in FY 2002 
(as mentioned in Section 4.5) could be further examined.  Additionally, further 
examination of the variation in command or type of usage (refueling, training etc.) may 
be of value to analysists at those commands.  Appendix D contains charts of the fuel 
performance by each MD category broken out by the Major Commands.  The colors used 
in Appendix D are consistent with the majority of the thesis, red for new engines, green 
for retired, and blue for engines in use over the full time period. In each case, AFMC 
shows higher variation in fuel performance, likely as a result of how AFMC uses aircraft. 
Lastly, a normalization for the amount of cargo, or alternately the weight of the 
aircraft, would also improve the results of this research.  Much of the variation in fuel 
performance is likely explainable by the weight of the aircraft.  A limitation for this 
research though is that would entail significant resources in order to collect in order to 
compile the necessary database.  Research could also be performed on Navy systems. 
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5.5 Chapter and Thesis Summary 
In this chapter concluded the thesis by restating and answering the research 
questions from Chapter I.  Fuel efficiency can be calculated from data that is already 
captured by AFTOC, but maintenance costs caused by modification or tied directly to an 
engine is not available the way the AF currently collects data.  The costs allocated to 
engines is estimated by ratios and, significantly, does not include CLS at all since CLS is 
generally not traceable to components. If the AF desires to track the costs of engines it 
will require some amount of restricting of the line of accounting or contract reporting 
requirements.  Further complicating engines maintenance analysis is the inability to 
compare steady-state engines when starting with the AFTOC stand up date of 1996. 
We also used the JSTARS re-engine effort as a case study for potential savings. 
While we are left with a significant shortfall for estimating the costs of maintenance, the 
saving potential in fuel could be approximated to a present value of $136M.  Different 
assumptions as far as inflation, usage and the range of actual fuel savings will provide 
different point estimates 
This research could be improved if costs could be more narrowly pinned down, 
but regardless the results are overwhelming for the cargo aircraft.  There are significant 
savings available for the reduction of O&S costs in the future, both in maintenance and 
fuel as the AF modernizes its inventory of engines. Further areas of research are available 
to exam performance metrics that can be analyzed or normalized by command or usage. 
 
74 
Appendix A – Acronym Listing 
ACAT Acquisition Category  
AFLCMC Air Force Life-Cycle Management Center  
AFTOC Air Force Total Ownership Costs 
BY Base Year 
CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
CBO Congressional Budget Office  
CEMS Consolidated Engine Management System 
CER Cost Estimating Relationship 
CLS Contractor Logistics Support  
DLR Depot Level Maintenance 
DoD Department of Defense 
FAS Fuel Automated System 
FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Centers  
FH Flying Hours 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO Government Accountability Office  
LCC Life Cycle Costs  
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program  
MDS Mission Designation Series 
O&S Operations and Support 
OAC Operating Agency Code  
OPTEMPO Operations Tempo  
PAA Primary Aircraft Assigned 
PAI Primary Aircraft Inventory 
PEC Program Element Code  
PM Program Manager 
RC/CC Resource Center  
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation  
REMIS Resources Management Information Systems 
RERP Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining 
SLEP Service Life Extension Programs 
SPO System Program Office  
TAI Total Aircraft Inventory 
TMS Type Series Modification  
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
WSARA Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act  
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Appendix B – Listing of Included MDS Categories and Engines 
MDS 
Category Engine TMS MDS 
Total 
Inventory 
(over time) 
MDS 
Category Engine TMS MDS 
Total 
Inventory 
(over time) 
C-5 F138GE100 C-5M 577.5 C-135 F108GE100 KC-135R 21784.75 
  TF39GE1 C-5A 3499.25     KC-135T 3287.25 
    C-5B 2818   F108GE201 RC-135S 86.25 
    C-5C 125.5     RC-135U 68.75 
C-130 AE2100 AC-130J 43.75     RC-135V 292.25 
    C-130J 675.5     RC-135W 291.5 
    EC-130J 48.5     TC-135S 10.5 
    HC-130J 128.75     TC-135W 96.25 
    MC-130J 243.25   TF33PW102 C-135E 49.75 
    WC-130J 42.25     EC-135E 33 
  T56A15 AC-130H 478     EC-135K 23.5 
    AC-130U 1073     EC-135N 22.25 
    AC-130W 261.5     EC-135Y 11 
    C-130E 309.75     KC-135D 106 
    C-130H 19337.25     KC-135E 4220 
    EC-130E 380.75     KC-135R 5.75 
    EC-130H 951.5     NKC-135E 51.75 
    GC-130H 3.75   TF33PW5 C-135B 34.25 
    HC-130N 663.5     C-135C 36.75 
    HC-130P 1338.5     OC-135B 74.25 
    LC-130H 601.75     RC-135S 53.25 
    MC-130E 568     RC-135W 125.5 
    MC-130H 1601.5     TC-135S 25 
    MC-130P 1669.25     TC-135W 16.25 
    MC-130W 128     WC-135W 42.75 
    TC-130H 44.75   TF33PW9 EC-135C 76.5 
    WC-130H 594.75     NKC-135B 25.5 
  T56A7 C-130E 8535.75     RC-135U 43.75 
    GC-130E 16.5     RC-135V 133.5 
            WC-135C 52.5 
F-15 F100PW100 F-15A 2184.5 F-16 F100PW200 F-16A 321.75 
    F-15B 465.75     F-16B 162.25 
    F-15C 5599   F100PW220 F-16A 720 
    F-15D 1212.75     F-16B 331.75 
    GF-15C 4.5     F-16C 6049.75 
    YF-15A 5.25     F-16D 1525.75 
  F100PW220 F-15A 378   F100PW229 F-16C 1451 
    F-15B 32.5     F-16D 260.25 
    F-15C 7009.75   F110GE100 F-16C 10207 
    F-15D 821.5     F-16D 1340.25 
    F-15E 4977.25   F110GE129 F-16C 3410.75 
  F100PW229 F-15E 3997.75     F-16D 531 
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Appendix C, Maintenance Cost Statistics with Outliers Included 
 
As discussed 12 outliers were removed from the Section 4.11 of Chapter IV.  
Unlike with fuel performance, large outliers are possible based on how maintenance costs 
are performed.  While unusual, it is not surprising if maintenance in one year is three or 
four times higher the next year, which would be unusual in fuel performance. 
Since this thesis is based on typical operation, outliers more than 3.5 standard 
deviations from the mean were removed.  In total, 12 outliers were removed, seven on 
full period engines and five on retired engines.  Due to the nature of the data all 12 were 
3.5 or more standard deviations above the mean, and none below. Seven were from the 
C-130 models, two from F-15s and one each from F-16, C-135s, and C-5s. Outliers were 
identified using histograms by MDS and TMS, two examples are shown below: as shown 
below (C-5B and F-16A/B): 
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Since Section 4.11 is based on charts, removing outliers like the one above create 
meaningful figures.  With removing outliers, Figure 24 (and others) would not be very 
meaningful and look like this: 
 
For completion Table 20 is replicated below and includes all data points. 
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Appendix D – Fuel Performance by MD Catergory by Major Command 
MD Catergory C-130s
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MD Catergory C-135
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MD Category C-5
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MD Category F-15
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MD Category F-16
 
83 
 
References 
Air Force Economics and Business Management. (2017) SAF/FMCE. B-52 Re-Engine 
Business Case Analysis. 
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Director of Propulsion. (2014). The Engine 
Handbook. 
Air Force Total Ownership Costs Helpdesk. (2019). F-4 Fuel and Flying Hours Under 
Reported. 
Air Force Total Ownership Costs Helpdesk. (2017). CAIG/CAPE Engine Costs. 
Banford, A., Naegle, B., & Powley, E. (2014). Naval Postgraduate School. Analyzing the  
        Effects of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. 
Boito, M., Light, T., Mills, P.,& Baldwin, L. (2016). RAND Corporation. Managing U.S. 
Air Force Aircraft Operating and Support Costs. 
Boito, M., Keating, E., Wallace, J., Deblois, B., & Blum, I. (2015). Metrics to Compare 
Aircraft Operating and Support Costs in the Department of Defense. 
Congressional Budget Office. (2018). Operating Costs of Aging Air Force Aircraft. 
www.cbo.gov/publication/54113 
Department of Defense. (2016). Operating and Support Cost Management Guidebook. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Ferry, G. J. (2013). Cost Growth Above Inflation (CGAI) In Operating And Support 
(O&S) Costs In Raw Materials For Air Force Aircraft (Unpublished master's thesis). 
Air Force Institute of Technology.  
Fry, F. G. (2010). Optimizing Aircraft Availability: Where To Spend Your Next O&M 
Dollar (Unpublished master's thesis). Air Force Institute of Technology. 
Government Accountability Office. (2010). DoD needs better information and guidance 
to more effectively manage and reduce operating and support costs of major weapon 
systems (Report No. GAO-10-717). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office 
84 
Government Accountability Office. (2012). Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight 
of Estimated Long- term Costs for Operating and Supporting Major Weapon Systems 
(Report No. GAO-12-340). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 
Government Accountability Office. (2018). Weapon System Sustainment Selected Air 
Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and 
Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified (Report No. GAO-18-678). Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Guertin, N. H. (2013). The Impact of Maintenance Free Operating Period Approach to 
Acquisition Approaches, System Sustainment, and Costs (Unpublished master's 
thesis). Naval Postgraduate School. 
Harrison, S. (2013). The Impact of Increasing Acquisition Costs on the Operation and 
Support Budget for Military Equipment. Australian Defense Science and Technology 
Organisation, (June). 
Hewitson, S. C., Ritschel, J. D., White, E., & Brown, G. (2018). Analyzing operating and 
support costs for Air Force aircraft. Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics, 2(1), 
38–54. 
Heritage Foundation. (2019, October 30). U.S. Air Force, An Assessment of U.S. Military 
Power. Retrieved from https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessment-us-
military-power/us-air-force  
Jones, G., White, E. D., Ryan, E. T., & Ritschel, J. D. (2014). Investigation into the Ratio 
of Operating and Support Costs to Life-Cycle Costs for DoD Weapon Systems. 
Defense Acquisition Research Journal, 21(1), 442–464. 
Kiley, G. T., & Skeen, J. (2001). The effects of aging on the costs of operating and 
maintaining military equipment. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office.  
MacIsaac, B., & Langton, R. (2011). Gas turbine propulsion systems. Chichester: Wiley.  
Mouton, C. A., Powers, J. D., Romano, D. M., Guo, C. Bednarz, S. & O’Connel, C., 
(2015). RAND Corporation. Fuel Reduction for the Mobility Air Forces. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.. (2014). 
Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
85 
O’Hanlon, G. B. (2018). An Analysis Of Aircraft Operating And Support Cost Element 
Structures And Their Contribution To Total Costs (Unpublished master's thesis). Air 
Force Institute of Technology. 
O’Hanlon, G., Ritschel, J., White, E., & Brown, G. (2018). Delineating Operating and 
Support Costs in Aircraft Platforms. Defense Acquisition Research Journal, 25(3), 
264–287. doi: 10.22594/dau.18-801.25.03 
Ritschel, J.D., Ritschel T.L (2016). Organic or Contract Support: Investigating Cost and 
Performance in Aircraft Sustainment. Journal of Transportation Management. 
Rolls Royce (2005). The jet engine. Chichester: Wiley. 
Ryan, E. T. (2012). Cost-Based Decision Model for Valuing System Design Options. Air 
Force Institute of Technology. 
Ryan, E., Jacques, D., Colombi, J., & Schubert, C. (2012). A proposed methodology to 
characterize the accuracy of life cycle cost estimates for DoD programs. Procedia 
Computer Science, 8, 361–369. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2012.01.073 
Unger, E. J. (2009). RAND Corporation. An Examination of the Relationship Between 
Usage and Operating and Support Costs of U.S. Air Force Aircraft. 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C., Pub. L. 111-23 (2009) 
Rolls Royce (2005). The jet engine. Chichester: Wiley.
86 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing 
data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for 
Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently 
valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
22-03-2020 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
October 2018 – March 2020 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Quantifying the Effects of Aircraft Engine Upgrades on 
Operating and Support Costs 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Myers, Bradford A. Master Sergeant, USAF 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT-ENV-MS-20-M-229 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center 
5135 Pearson Road, Building 10 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 
ATTN: Mr. Shawn Valentine (shawn.valentine@us.af.mil) 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
AFLCMC/FZCE 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
     DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. 
14. ABSTRACT  
As research into Operating and Support (O&S) costs matures, the focus can narrow.  This research represents a first of its 
kind for the Air Force; it is an empirical study to analyze the effects of new engines on fuel efficiency and maintenance 
over those engines they replace.  Within this research, new engines are those with distinct Type Series Modification (TMS) 
designators that appear within categories of Mission Designation System (MDS) aircraft.  The only new engines appear on 
C-5s, C-130s, and C-135s. The inclusion of retired engines brings in two fighter aircraft, F-15s and F-16s.  The data source 
is the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database, which collects flying hours and gallons of fuel and is available 
by engine.  Using this data, the realized fuel efficiencies of the new engines can be effectively graphed, quantified and 
tested. Maintenance costs are not tracked by engine but are approximated from ratios determined by AFTOC.  Of note, 
these costs do not include Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) which may weaken the analysis for estimating future engine 
maintenance costs.  From the data available, the potential savings that can be realized in fuel and maintenance are 
significant and do not come at a trade-off in engine performance. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Operating and Support Costs, Engine Upgrades, Engine Maintenance Costs, Engine Fuel Efficiency 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: N/A 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
98 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Edward White, AFIT/ENC 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636, ext. 4540   (NOT DSN) 
(Edward.White@afit.edu) 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
